Abstract-Recently numerous sensing applications from the Internet of Things(IoT), such as traffic monitoring and noise map making, require the expensive installation cost. To handle this challenge, crowd sensing, as a new paradigm, has received extensive concerns. To achieve good service quality, incentive mechanisms are necessary to attract more users to participate in crowd sensing. However, Traditional incentive mechanisms such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its variants, are not applicable for practical continuous crowd sensing applications, where bids cannot be solicited and only posted pricing mechanisms can be implemented. To tackle the issue, we propose a novel crowd sensing framework by applying all-pay auctions, and then design a collection-behavior based multi-parameter posted pricing mechanism by applying crowd aversion and posted pricing mechanisms. Simulation results indicate that incentive mechanisms in our proposed framework outperform the existing solution with respect to user participation and submission quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently Internet of Things(IoT), as a novel networking model, has aroused extensive concerns for solving the significant demand from people's life. However, numerous sensing applications of the IoT, such as traffic monitoring and noise map making, object tracking and identification, require deployment for a large number of sensors, thereby inflict the expensive installation cost [1] - [4] . To address this challenge, crowd sensing, as a new paradigm which leverages the power of crowds to collect sensing data from a large number of sensor-equipped mobile phone users, has received considerable research efforts for enabling these intractable applications. Although crowd sensing is so promising, good incentive mechanisms are necessary to support it for achieving good service quality [5] - [7] .
On the other hand, many omnipresent sensing applications [8] - [10] expect that the practical crowd sensing systems have the ability to satisfy the coverage requirements under budget constraints and provide continuous sensing services from a practical scene, where users arrive in a sequential order. Thus, the level of user participation and the submission quality become two crucial factors for the success of crowd sensing. Previous works about crowd sensing focus on traditional mechanisms that solicit bids such as the VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its variants (e.g. [11] ): posted pricing mechanism are simulated by determining an offer price without observing the user's bid, and pay the user only if its bid does not exceed the offer (see Fig.  1(a) ). However, in continuous crowd sensing applications, bids cannot be solicited and only posted pricing mechanisms can be implemented. To make posted pricing mechanisms applicable here, a new framework is proposed based on all-pay auctions, which illustrates a crowd sensing process in sequential crowd sensing applications. Compared with traditional frameworks, our proposed framework has the potential for providing higher quality sensing data and guaranteeing extensive user participating under given budget constraints, especially for crowd sensing applications, where users with multi-parameter behavior abilities arrive in a sequential order. This is because that traditional bidding mechanisms require signing a contract with the winning bidder and thus could not be viable for practical crowd sensing applications when outcomes are not verifiable and contracts are incomplete in the trusted sever. In these mechanisms, the participants with higher true valuation become starved frequently to win. Accordingly, they lose their interest in continuous crowd sensing actions and drop out of the auction [12] .
However, when users arrive in a sequential order and are offered take-it-or-leave-it prices for continuous crowd sensing applications, sequential posted pricing mechanisms and sequential all-pay auctions need to be introduced to our framework to guarantee extensive user participation and high submission quality. As two crucial human factors for guaranteeing extensive user participation and high submission quality, at present, only a hand of works tend to separately study them for crowd sensing applications. Consequently, only one of these two objectives can be achieved. The reason is that, if all-pay auctions and posted pricing mechanisms are addressed at the same time for sequential crowd sensing applications, the issue would become more challenging. For example, some truthfulness enhanced posted pricing techniques [13] , [14] stimulate extensive users to participate in sequential crowd sensing, but they can not encourage users to make every effort to submit sensing data under budget constraints, hard to implement high quality submission coverage constraints for crowd sensing applications, since it is not practical to assume that the requester will always provide an unlimited budget to achieve good service quality. The authors of [15] explore the effects of extensive user participating from an experimental perspective, but they do not approach the truthfulness issue that is one of the most pivotal factors determining extensive user participating levels. Therefore, how to simultaneously address both sequential posted pricing mechanisms and sequential all-pay auctions issues becomes particularly challenging for crowd sensing applications under the coverage requirements and budget constraints to guarantee extensive user participation and high submission quality.
To overcome above challenges, we first analyze the main steps of real sequential crowd sensing applications -task distribution, the selection of sensing tasks, data sensing, and payments -on the basis of user sequential arrival ways. Then, we propose a collection-behavior based multi-parameter posted pricing mechanism by applying sequential all-pay auctions and crowd aversion strategies. Specifically speaking, our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We attempt to explore a collection-behavior based multiparameter posted pricing mechanism under budget constraints for practical crowd sensing applications, where users arrive in a sequential order. In order to avoid the risk-aversion behavior from the participants, we apply allpay auctions to stimulate the participants to exert higher effort to achieve the better sensing quality service for the platform of crowd sensing applications.
• We characterize users' behavior abilities as a multiparameter vector. We focus on the equilibrium between the platform and participators. In equilibrium, a user only participates in some sensing group maximizing his expected profit. By mixing sequential multi-parameter posted pricing mechanisms and sequential all-pay auctions, we can obtain every user best response behavior effort bids based on crowd aversion. Due to the introduction of crowd aversion, our mechanism not only addresses the extensive user participating based on the coverage constraints, but also guarantees submission quality problem under given budget constraints for sequential crowd sensing applications.
• We propose a novel crowd sensing framework by applying all-pay auctions. Through an extensive simulation, results indicate that incentive mechanisms in our proposed framework outperform the existing solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present our system model, related definitions and our design goals. In Section III, we design a collection-behavior based multi-parameter posted pricing mechanism for crowd sensing, followed by the performance evaluation in IV. Finally, Section V presents concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
We consider the following crowd sensing system model. Assume that the following system model consists of a crowd sensing application platform, many mobile device users, a requester with a budget B > 0. The requester posts a crowd sensing application that resides in the cloud and consists of multiple sensing servers. A set of users U = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n }, which are interested in the crowd sensing application tasks, are connected to the cloud by WiFi connections or cellular networks (e.g., GSM/3G/4G). The crowd sensing application first publicizes a group sequential sensing tasks towards an Area of Interest (AoI).
Specifically, we form the interactive process between the platform and users as sequential all-pay auctions, where the plethora of users with different preferences and skill abilities arrive and compete in a contest by their efforts in one period. Consider a game in which n users choose among J contests. Let B j denote the maximum prize reward offered in contest j ∈ {1, · · · , J}. User i has a vector of multi-parameter behavior abilities θ i = (θ i1 , · · · , θ iJ ), where θ ij denotes user i's behavior abilities at contest j. User behavior abilities in the contest j are described by the distribution function Φ j . Thus, we can assume that the vector of multi-parameter behavior abilities for each user is drawn from a continuous joint probability distribution over [θ, θ] J (θ and θ denote the least skilled behavior ability and the most skilled behavior ability respectively).
In our proposed framework, each competing user can submit one solution at most. The user determines which contest he choose and the effort e of the submitted solution in the contest according to its preference and skill ability. The platform determines the payment or subsidies M j1 , M j2 , · · · , M jnj to the top n j (highest-ranked) submissions of the contest j in one
: the user with the best submission receives M j1 , the first runner-up receives M j2 , and so forth. Then we formulate K groups of contests according to their winning prizes Fig. 2) .
B. Problem Formulation
Our objective is to design mechanisms based on users' multi-parameter behavior abilities to simultaneously satisfy the requirements of both high quality and extensive user participating crowd sensing service quality. Consider a riskneutral budget constrained sequential all-pay auctions whose utility function is U j (e j1 , · · · , e jLj , B j ) = Lj i μ ij e ij − B j , where μ ij is the constant marginal utility, and e ij is the expected efforts of the i-th best solution in the contest j. A utility-maximizing sensing group j should select the number of prizes L j , the total prize budget B j in the sensing group j, the allocation of prizes M j1 +M j2 +· · ·+M jLj = B j which maximizes the platform's utility U j (e j1 , · · · , e jLj , B j ). We assume the total prize budget is fixed in every sensing group due to the demands of crowd sensing applications, i.e.
where B j is allocated by the specific crowd sensing application. More generally, for the platform, given a budget B and a reserved effort m, finding a subset A to maximize the coverage issue of sensing data, is equivalent to maximizing the coverage issue of utilities. Besides, for every sequential user i, they will only participate in the sensing group j that maximize
n−1 dx, where p j is the probability that the user selects the contest j.
III. OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE SENSING CONTEST
In this section, we will design a collection-behavior based multi-parameter posted pricing mechanism for crowd sensing. First, we apply crowd aversion and a proportional share allocation rule to ensure the extensive user participation. Then we introduce the all-pay auction mechanism to achieve the high submission quality.
A. Threshold Effort Decision
In this section, we derive the submodularity property of our objective functions, which will be leveraged by our mechanism.
Definition 1 (Submodular Function): Let V be a finite set, a function U : V → R is submodular if it satisfies the "diminishing returns" property,
where R is the set of reals.
U (T ∪ {i}) − U (T ) is often called the marginal increase of U with respect to {i} and T . The connection between submodularity and value of efforts is very intuitive in the IoT example: Acquiring a new observation effort will help us more when only a few other observation efforts have been made thus far, than when many locations have already been observed.
The general maximal problem of submodular functions is NP-hard, for example, the max-cover problem. There are branch-and-bound algorithms for the maximal problem of submodular functions, such as the dichotomy algorithm described
Algorithm 1 GetEffortThreshold
Input: Sample set X j , stage budget constraint B j . Output: Effort threshold e j . 1: Compute the optimal winners' number and the optimal prize amounts M ij (i ∈ {1, · · · , L j }); 2: Sort their marginal utility relative to prize amounts in the contest j, s.t.
A ← A ∪ i;
i ← arg max j∈X j (U lj (A )/M lj );
7:
k ← k + 1; 8: end while 9: e j ← B j /U (A ); 10: return e j ; in [16] , however, they do not guarantee required running time. To handle this challenge, we construct our mechanism by applying the greedy approach, which is a natural fit due to its monotonicity when users in every contest j are sorted according to their efforts per marginal contribution. Furthermore, to handle the sequential arrival, we observe a fraction of the input in some contest j and make an informed decision based on the sample outcomes of every contest j on the sequential participants. In a sample stage of every contest j, we assume that the arriving users always perform and submit their crowd sensing efforts. Receiving the submission from some user, the platform evaluates the quality according to the effort from the user. In essence, sampling the arrival sequences on all users in every contest j that arrive at the end of every time step by applying all-pay auctions,we can compute the number of optimal winners L j and the optimal bidding efforts M ij (i ∈ {1, · · · , L j }) of the contest j by applying the results of [17] .
Furthermore, we can use the above outcomes to estimate a threshold effort. Since in each stage the effort threshold is fixed, it is a natural to lead into a proportional share allocation rule to calculate the effort threshold from every sample set X with the allocated stage-budget B . We first calculate the optimal winning participant number L j and the optimal prize amounts M ij (i ∈ {1, · · · , L}) of the contest j to improve the submission quality (users' efforts) for the users arriving during the next time step. Based on these values, we can sort the sampled users in terms of increasing marginal contributions per prize amount. Thus, this sorting in the contest j implies:
where U ij denotes U ij|X i−1 (= U (X i−1 ∪{i})− U (X i−1 )), X i = {1, 2, · · · , i}, and X 0 = ∅. Thus, a specifical greedy strategy can be constructed by the iteration process(see Algorithm 1) to ensure the extensive user participation.
Algorithm 2 The Budgeted Collection-behavior Based incentive mechanism under Sequential all-pay auctions(BCS)
Input: Budget constraint B, sensing task deadlines T 1: Initialize: quantiles {0, 1, · · · , log T }, for each contest
for every j ∈ {1, · · · , J} do
4:
Calculate e j =GetEffortThreshold(S j , 2B j ); 5: Set B j = 2B j , A j ← ∅; 6: end for 7: while q j < t ≤ q j+1 do 8: for every user i who arrives at time t do 9:
User i determines his effort bids e ij according to his behavior abilities and collection-behavior based mixture distribution; 10: if e ij ≤ e j · U ij (A j ) ≤ B j − j∈Aj e ij then
11:
Offer e j to the user; 12: if the user accepts e j then 13: e ij = e j , A j = A j ∪ {i};
14:
end if 15: end if
16:
S j = S j ∪ {i};
17:
end for 18: end while 19: end for
B. Posted Pricing Mechanism
In this subsection, we first present the method of the user' effort adjustment based on the collection behavior. Then, we design a posted pricing mechanism to stimulate users to participate in some contest of the above applications.
1) Collection-behavior Based Behavior Adjustment: Obviously, the above proportional share allocation rule does not account for the effect of users' collection behavior on the user participation in crowd sensing applications with multiple parameters. According to [18] , each user also have some desire to averse to the currently "hot" behavior parameters to enhance the total coverage quality for crowd sensing applications, thereby obtaining more prizes. This can be achieved in a variety of the following simple ways. Let f is the current distributions over adjustment of behavior (determining which contest he will participate in) in the population, we can define a kind of "inverse" to the distribution by letting g a = (1 − f a )/(n − 1), where n = b∈{1,2,··· ,J} (1 − f b ) + 1 is the normalizing factor. We apply the selecting of the user behavior parameter to g. Assuming that each user j has the best response effort bid vector e j (calculated in [19] ) and the mixture coefficient α j respectively, at time step t, it selects his behavior according to the mixture distribution (1−α j ) g+α j e j . Thus, each user displays a tendency to "avoid the crowd", alleviated as before by the best response effort bids or their own preferences.
2) Mechanism Designing: Before describing the details of our algorithm, it is useful to outline the algorithm's main ideas. In essence, the sequential posted pricing mechanism in our algorithm is quite simple: it dynamically increases the sample size and updates the effort threshold; then, based on the effort threshold, our proposed posted mechanism provides a price for the sequential arrival user while increasing the budget it uses for allocation; further, the arriving user determines whether to make sensing according to their current behavior ability. As a result, users practise their sensing task for the submission when their cost is below the established threshold price.
When a budget of B j /2 i of every time step q i is applied to allocate sensing tasks, our mechanism (see Algorithm 2) will iterate over q i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , log T }(see Fig. 3 ). First of all, our proposed mechanism calculates a sample set of winners by applying the all-pay auctions and then provides a threshold price in every contest by applying Algorithm 1. In the sequel, when the arrival user efforts from his behavior abilities are above the threshold effort and the budget has not been exhausted, the arriving user chooses to accept the data sensing task. Finally, its entire budget is allocated to the users that their efforts are less than the threshold efforts.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the well-known Manhattan model obtained from the Google Map [20] is used to study the effects of extensive user participation and sensing data submission quality for the above application to evaluate the performance of our proposed BCS mechanism.
A. Experimental Setup
In our mechanism's simulation, each mobile phone can sense the range of 7 meters. The AoI obtained from the Google Map is Manhattan, NY, which covers a range with a range from west to east with a total length of 1.27km and a total width of 0.41 km. The size of data sensing area is set randomly. In summary, we used 1887 sensing data packets that permeate with different locations via 200 different users [20] . All assessments are averaged over 50 sensing tasks. Our goals are to assess the performance of the online mechanism on real effort bids as well as to verify users' participating response.
B. Effects of Crowd Aversion
To test the performance of our BCS mechanism, we use the users' threshold effort bids from sequential all-pay auctions and perform the comparison under different constraints. One has no crowd aversion about submodular coverage constraints, and the other applies crowd aversion to maximize the utilities under the coverage constraints proposed in this paper. We simulate these algorithms on different budgets to examine the change in the mean threshold efforts in multi-parameter behavior abilities as the number of users increases in the sample. Fig. 4(a) shows that the mean threshold efforts converged quickly. In the whole, our BCS mechanism with crowd aversion mechanism achieves a good sensing data quality.
C. Effects of User Participation and Submission Quality
To examine the effects of extensive user participation and submission sensing data quality, we plot the number of participants and the total utility value as a function of different budgets in Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c) respectively. In the Winner-TakeAll scheme, in which a single winning user obtains all prizes, most of users drop out of the contest, since the probability of winning decreases as the number of users increases. Thus, the total utility value would decreased from its maximum. Users in the Multiple-Winners scheme, where multiple winners only obtain the same prizes, exert lower effort. However, they can get more total utility values when there are larger numbers of users as more budgets are provided. Both Fig. 4(b) and Fig.  4(c) show that although the BCS mechanism can enhance the levels of extensive user participation and submission sensing data quality without the control of crowd aversion, they can not maximize the total utilities under the submodular coverage constraints. We also observe that our BCS scheme maximizes the total utilities under the submodular coverage constraints. Thus, the BCS with crowd aversion outperforms the existing solution regarding the level of user participating and the submission quality, just as illustrated in Fig. 4(b) and Fig.  4(c) .
Furthermore, we also quantify submission quality in each contest by the marginal quality, i.e., the quotient of the difference between the maximum and the minimum quality divided by the maximum quality. Fig. 4(d) indicates that our BCS mechanism has a lower marginal quality than the mechanism without crowd aversion. Thus, our BCS mechanism achieves a good coverage constraint, when it satisfies the requirements of the extensive user participating and high quality data submission.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK In this paper, we present a collection-behavior based multiparameter incentive strategy to motivate users to exert the most sensing effort by mixing sequential all-pay auctions and posted pricing mechanisms for crowd sensing. We focus on a sequential crowd sensing scenario where users randomly arrive one by one online. We model the problem as sequential all-pay auctions where every bidder must pay regardless of whether he wins the prize, which is awarded to the corresponding bidder over time, and sensing data are submitted sequentially. Compared with existing incentive mechanisms based on the reverse auction, where deals are performed prior to data sensing, the strategy in our proposed framework motivates users' activity to exert the most sensing effort and extensive participating for practical crowd sensing applications. Future research could expand on our BCS mechanism by studying the effects of submission quality and privacy protection. The main question left open by this research work is whether there exits an online bidding effort mechanism for sequential crowd sensing applications.
